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I

n “Personality Disorders: Moral or Medical Kinds—or Both?” Peter Zachar and Nancy
Nyquist Potter (2010) reject any general dichotomy between morality and mental health,
and specifically between character vices and
personality disorders. In doing so, they provide a
nuanced and illuminating discussion that connects
Aristotelian virtue ethics to a multidimensional
understanding of personality disorders. I share
their conviction that dissolving morality–health
dichotomies is the starting point for any plausible
understanding of human beings (Martin 2006),
but I register some qualms about their discussion
of responsibility.
Zachar and Potter target the morality-health
dichotomy as it appears in Louis C. Charland’s
(2004; 2006) discussions of personality disorders.
They might have said more, beginning with Charland’s insights. Building on Carl Elliott’s (1996)
work, Charland notes that one group of personality disorders, cluster B (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2000, 685–686), are defined
using moral concepts and can only be successfully
treated if the person undergoes a moral change
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based on moral effort. Most dramatically, antisocial personality disorder is characterized as “a
pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation
of the rights of others” shown by such things as
“deceitfulness,” “reckless disregard for safety of
self or others,” and “lack of remorse” for harming others (APA 2000, 706). Similarly, borderline
(BPD), histrionic, and narcissistic personality disorders make explicit or tacit reference to lack of
moral empathy. “Curing” these disorders requires
moral effort and moral transformation, although
psychological and pharmaceutical treatments can
also be employed. It is essential for clinicians to
acknowledge that treating cluster B personality
disorders is in part a moral enterprise, for which
they might not be fully prepared. This all seems
to me right and important.
Charland goes astray, however, when he claims
that cluster B disorders are “really moral, and
not medical, conditions” (Charland 2004, 64). If
anything, his emphasis on how both psychiatric
and moral techniques enter into treating cluster
B disorders should open, rather than slam shut,
the door to an integrated moral–medical perspective. Indeed, many additional disorders in the
DSM tacitly employ moral criteria in specifying
“maladaptive” behavior and mental states, for
example, substance dependency, pathological
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gambling, pyromania, kleptomania, and pedophilia. Overcoming these problems typically
involves moral transformation, as with cluster
B personality disorders. More generally, I regard
moral commitment as typically involved in mustering the courage, honesty, and effort required
in much psychotherapy. Without collapsing vice
into mental disorder, we should acknowledge that
moral capacities such as minimal moral empathy
and self-control inevitably shape the understanding and treatment of maladaptive habits. And
rather than banishing moral assumptions from
psychiatry, we should ensure the assumptions are
sound (e.g., unlike the bigotry that once classified
homosexuality as a mental disorder).
Zachar and Potter illuminate how cluster B
personality disorders are simultaneously moral
phenomena and fit generic criteria for mental disorders, such as maladjustment, distress, disability,
and harm to self. They apply a multidimensional
theory of personality disorders that accents lack
of empathy and social relatedness and moves us
beyond the DSM depictions that Charland rightly
finds insufficient. They helpfully invoke John
Sadler’s (2005) Moral Wrongfulness Test that
warns psychiatrists to take special care (to avoid
inappropriate forms of moralism) to be sure health
criteria are being employed to define and diagnose
those conditions which are popularly condemned
on moral grounds. And they remind us that much
treatment involves advice and procedures that are
simultaneously moral and medical.
Whereas Charland said little about moral responsibility, apart from accepting responsibility as
part of moral transformation, Zachar and Potter
say considerably more. I find their comments
sometimes helpful but often problematic, for
three reasons. First, it is important to distinguish
(1) evaluating something (e.g., an act or habit)
as morally undesirable and (2) assigning moral
responsibility for it. We also need to distinguish
different senses of moral responsibility, including
(3) being morally accountable in general, (4) being
morally accountable for meeting specific responsibilities (obligations), (5) blameworthiness for
failing to meet obligations, and (6) actually blaming (adopting and expressing negative attitudes
toward) someone for their wrongdoing or faults.

Rather than sorting out these ideas, Zachar and
Potter blur them.
Consider this sentence: “The core problem [in
deciding whether personality disorders mitigate
responsibility for actions] is that if patients do
not have control over their choices and actions,
then the moral blame dished out by clinicians is
itself morally inappropriate” (Zachar and Potter
2010, 105). The sentence is jarring because, quite
apart from the control issue, clinicians have professional responsibilities to avoid expressing blame
toward their clients. This is a special responsibility, of course, that arises as part of their largely
nonjudgmental role as helpers. Zachar and Potter
note that individuals with BPD are often regarded
as “PIAs—pains in the ass” (2010, 104). Instead
of immediately following this comment with a
discussion of the special challenges to clinicians in
suspending blame, the authors switch to broader
feminist issues concerning whether women (who
comprise three fourths of persons with BPD) are
being wrongly blamed for behavior they cannot
control and even for healthy forms of behavior.
We are also told that “Potter is inclined to be more
demanding with respect to attributing disorder
status to BPD” because she questions whether
the “behaviors associated with BPD are actually
blameworthy, a question that requires clinicians
getting clearer on the degree to which patients with
BPD have control over their actions” (Zachar and
Potter 2010, 113). But surely we do not want the
definition of disorders to turn on matters of blameworthiness. Here it is worth recalling the DSM’s
cautionary statement: “The kinds of impairments
involved in disorders do not turn on or answer
questions about responsibility in other contexts,
such as law and morality” (APA 2000, xxxvii).
Second, after distinguishing between (1) evaluating something as morally undesirable and (6)
blaming persons for it, we need to distinguish
between doing either of these things with regard
to (7) a person’s overall character, (8) specific
tendencies such as impulsivity and emotional instability, (9) specific actions. For example, it might
be reasonable to mitigate responsibility for having
undesirable emotional tendencies and yet to hold
an individual fully accountable and blameworthy
for harmful actions. The presence of unhealthy and
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strong tendencies for which a person might not be
responsible is not an automatic excuse for acting
on the tendencies in harming others.
Third, and related to the last point, I believe
Zachar and Potter gesture too far in the direction
of excusing wrongdoing based on etiological factors. It is one thing to say, for example, that an
emotionally troubled person who was sexually
abused as a child should not be blamed for her
present emotional distress; it is quite another to
say she should not be held morally and legally accountable for murdering her children. Although
Zachar and Potter are aware of the problem, their
discussion often veers in the direction of using
personality disorders as excuses. They write, for
example, that “freedom and responsibility . . .
require not only the ability to choose between
available alternatives, but also the ability to choose
which desires one wants to have” (Zachar & Potter 2010, 105). That claim could easily be taken
as inviting rampant excusing of wrongdoing by
appealing to disordered desires. Again, applying
virtue ethics, Zachar and Potter illuminate how
habitual choices can result in inflexible and automatic habits for which we can be responsible.
But they also make generalizations like this: “It
is a truism that we cannot be held responsible for
those things that are out of our control” (Zachar
and Potter 2010, 105). Does the alleged truism
mean out of control at the time of action, or
viewed in terms of a lifetime of developing habits,
or both?
Perhaps bringing in addictions as an analogy
might help, especially addictions that grow out
of our immediate control (as well as manifest
lack of moral self-control) and reside at the core
of our personality, but which we had ample op-
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portunity to avoid developing or to have sought
help for earlier. In addition, rather than focusing
just on borderline and narcissistic personality disorders, more attention might be paid to antisocial
personality disorder, especially when it leads to
heinous acts such as murder. The entrenchment of
a sociopath’s murderous desire is not an excuse. It
would also be helpful to work with case studies to
sharpen distinctions between issues about diagnosis and therapy from issues about moral and legal
responsibility. Doing so would also make clear the
complexity that arises from ethical pluralism that
enters once we move beyond the minimal shared
moral understanding that informs psychiatric
judgments about health and disorders.
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